Definition, nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking

The United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) defines illicit trafficking as “the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it [...] or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with [...] this Protocol”.

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a modest-in-size market. It remains closely linked with further illegal activities and it is a supplementary rather than a primary source of income for the organised criminal groups (Europol). The illegal firearms trade generates between 125 million EUR to 236 million EUR per year globally, which represents between 10% to 20% of the total trade in legal firearms (EC). In 2015, it was estimated that 640 million of illicit firearms were in circulation –which account as of 1 illicit firearm per 11 people in the regions of the United Nations (EUCPN Secretariat). 

Whilst most arms trafficking is conducted by private entities, governments also contribute to the illicit trade of ammunition in contravention of UN arms embargoes. As revealed by Small Arms Survey, in recent years, several governments were involved in the undercovered delivery of SALW to armed groups in Somalia, breaching the long-standing UN arms embargo and destabilizing political dynamics in the region (Small Arms Survey). There is, therefore, a link between illicit and the legal trade in SALW. 

Amnesty International pinpointed the US, Russia, France, Germany and China as five largest authorized arms exporters; and Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia and Algeria as the five largest authorized arms importers (Amnesty International). While transnational flows in SALW serves as an indicator to understand the supplier-intermediator-user sequence of the illicit trade in firearms, black markets take place on a regional or local level and it predominantly emerges in conflict-armed areas, where the demand for unauthorized weapons is at stake (Small Arms Survey).

Main transnational firearms trafficking flows, 2016-17

Source: UNODC

From authorized legal trade to illicit trafficking 

One most common method for a firearm to exit the legal circuit and enter the illicit market is the “straw purchaser”. It occurs when an ineligible buyer of weapons uses another person (the ‘straw purchaser’) to purchase a firearm. This method is prevalent in the United States, and it has been commonly used to transfer SALW from US residents with no criminal records to violent armed groups in Mexico (Schroeder, 2013). 

The distinction between different forms of illicit firearms trafficking is not clear-cut, however, three major categories are identified as the sources of illicit firearms (UNODC):

  1. Illicit manufacturing. It entails the artisan production of design weapons or the factory-produced illicit copies of existing designs.

  2. Theft or diversion. It entails thefts or losses from legal manufacturers, illicit dissemination of military stockpiles, or the leakage or looting from existing military stocks. 

  3. Conversion, recycling and reactivation of firearms. It implies the alteration of an accessible replica firearm to function in a similar way as a restricted firearm.

Examples of stockpile diversion of firearms.

Source: Bevan, 2008

Drivers to illicit firearms trafficking

Three main types of players can be identified as drivers to illicit firearm trafficking:

  1. Existing demand. The illicit firearms-end users concern groups that procure firearms illegally to use in the pursuit of their goals (CSES). 

  2. Existing supply. Suppliers are likely to be motivated by economic considerations, at least where the act of supplying illicit weapons is intentional (CSES).

  3. Expertise. Private military contractors and mercenaries use their expertise to train weapon purchasers in their use and deployment (UNODC).

The expansion of global trade, the world’s black markets, the Internet and the recent growth of private military companies have further complicated the study of this domain (Griffiths and Wilkinson, 2007). Network of authorized and unauthorized actors take advantage of the high interconnectivity in the global scenario and the ability to bypass borders. Transport companies are often used to supply illicit end-users which severely violate civil aviation rules and challenge international and national legislations (Small Arms Survey).  

Ultimately, illicit firearms trafficking aggravates conflicts, destabilizes societies and hinders development. Illegally-held SALW stock the arsenals of armed groups, increase the lethality of violent crimes and provoke unquantifiable human suffering. To reduce the supply of illicit ammunition, a more nuanced approach to weapons-related markets must be undertaken, including the analysis of local dynamics, the leakages from the regulated to the unregulated market and a better understanding of the supplier-intermediator-user sequence of the illicit trade in firearms.

 

References

Griffiths, H. & Wilkinson A. (2007). Planes and Ships: Identification and Disruption of Clandestine Arms Transfers. Belgrade, Serbia: SEESAC. 

Schroeder, M., (2013). ‘Captured and Counted: Illicit weapons in Mexico and the Philippines’, in Small Arms Survey (ed) Small Arms Survey 2013: Everyday Dangers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.